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Autumn 2007 
 
Analysis 
Enhancing NATO's cooperation with international organizations 
 
David S. Yost explores how NATO could further combine its strengths with those of other international organizations. 
 
At the Riga Summit in November 2006, the NATO Allies 
endorsed a comprehensive civil-military approach to 
security. This approach marks another stage in a 
transition underway since the end of the Cold War. An 
essential part of this is improving the Alliance's 
cooperation with other international organizations. 
 
NATO's transition in responsibilities and tasks since the 
early 1990s has led to extensive cooperation with the 
United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), and many other international organizations. 
While much has been achieved, various factors - 
including national and inter-institutional rivalries - have 
at times complicated the pursuit of better relations. 
 
In addition, some states have retained a Cold War 
image of NATO as essentially a combat-oriented 
military organization. The attitude of "we do peace, 
NATO does war" also persists among some staff 
members of other international organizations. The fact that NATO has become the world's largest destroyer of small 
arms and light weapons is little-known outside the Alliance. 
 
NATO is perhaps half-way through a transition from its Cold War posture to one adapted to current and emerging 
security requirements. It has had to grapple with both urgent crisis response and long-term stabilization and 
reconstruction tasks. It cannot effectively meet these challenges alone. NATO and other major international security 
organizations have to find ways to work together more productively if they intend to achieve their shared goals. 
NATO in transition 
Since the breakup of the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the NATO Allies have had to deal with types of conflicts 
different from their Cold War preoccupation with deterring the outbreak of an alliance-versus-alliance conventional 
war that might escalate to nuclear war. 
 
Since the early 1990s, the Allies have had to focus on the prevention and containment of ethnic and political conflicts 
within and between states. Allied goals have extended beyond stopping the immediate violence to creating the 
conditions necessary for an enduring resolution of the conflicts. 
 
Since the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, the Allies have become conscious of how 
failing states - such as Afghanistan under Taliban rule - can become havens for terrorist movements and organized 
criminal groups. To prevent new havens from being established, the Allies must achieve more than victory in the 
traditional sense of defeating an enemy's forces in combat. 
 
The tasks of state-building and democratization cannot be accomplished with purely military means. Sustainable 
security requires stabilization, reconstruction, economic and social development, and good governance. Constructive 
intervention requires the contributions of multiple international organizations and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). 
 
In fact, the Alliance has been 
developing a "comprehensive 
approach" to deal with security 
challenges since the early 1990s. 
The Allies have previously used 
phrases such as 'Enhanced Civil-
Military Cooperation', 'Concerted 
Planning and Action', and an 
'Effects-Based Approach to 
Operations'. The comprehensive 
approach is similar to these 
concepts in calling for coordinated activity by multiple types of organizations in cooperation with local authorities to 
promote security and development. 
 
The NATO Allies confirmed at the Riga Summit what they have recognized in practice since the early 1990s: other 
organizations have capabilities and mandates that NATO lacks to achieve the objectives it shares with its 
international partners. The three organizations with which NATO has worked most closely are the United Nations, the 
European Union, and the OSCE. 
Diversity as a source of strength 
The fact that international organizations have differing strengths and mandates has often helped in working out a 
sensible division of labour. NATO's most obvious comparative advantage is in its military capabilities, including its 
expertise in planning, organizing and conducting operations involving the armed forces of the Allies and security 
partners. 
 
On some occasions the Allies have intervened decisively to separate warring parties and put an end to atrocities - as 
with, for example, Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Operation Allied Force in 1999 
in the Kosovo conflict. 
 
The Allies have also played a leading role in providing security for the activities of other organizations. While not their 
sole raison d' tre, this can be seen in the following NATO operations: 
• the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1995 to 
2004, 
• the Kosovo Force (KFOR) since 1999, and 
• the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2003. 
The Alliance has some non-military civil capabilities, notably in 
civil emergency planning, defence aspects of security sector 
reform, and partnership cooperation programmes. However, 
NATO is clearly incapable of undertaking the full range of 
tasks required for state-building and social and economic 
development. 
 
The United Nations Security Council has a unique role in 
providing a framework of legitimacy for the use of force in 
situations other than the self-defence contingency covered by 
the UN Charter's Article 51 and the North Atlantic Treaty's 
Article 5. All the NATO Allies strongly prefer to conduct non-
Article 5 operations with the legitimacy provided by a UN 
Security Council mandate. 
 
Moreover, the Allies regard UN leadership in coordinating 
multilateral stabilization and reconstruction efforts as highly 
desirable, as with the UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA). Some UN offices and agencies such as the Department of Peace Keeping Operations 
(DPKO), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the Office of 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have capabilities unmatched by other organizations. 
 
The UN also has an unparalleled ability to attract resources on a global basis. 
 
The European Union has civilian assets that are outside NATO's scope of activity but that are essential to state 
capacity-building, including police, justice, and rule of law programmes. 
 
The EU has financial resources and development means that can help in the economic recovery of war-torn 
societies. In some situations, the EU can offer an incentive to promote cooperation - the prospect of EU membership 
- that may be more potent than NATO's capacity to offer partnership or membership. 
 
Under the NATO-EU "Berlin-Plus" arrangements completed in March 2003, NATO has twice provided assets and 
capabilities to support EU-led operations: Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, from 
March to December 2003, and Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 2004. NATO and the 
EU have coordinated their efforts in support of the African Union in Darfur, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNAMA in Afghanistan, 
and elsewhere. 
 
The OSCE's agenda has been for the most part distinct from (and complementary to) that of the Alliance. The OSCE 
concentrates on promoting: 
• democratization, 
• the rule of law, 
• respect for human rights, 
• reconciliation, 
• conflict prevention, and 
• post-conflict rehabilitation and peace-building. 
In the political-military domain, the OSCE has provided a framework for arms control and has focused on confidence- 
and security-building measures, transparency measures, and "norm-setting". This last activity extends from 
implementing political and military codes of conduct to promoting respect for "best practices" guidelines in post-
conflict rehabilitation processes. The Alliance has provided security for OSCE activities in territories where NATO 
forces have been deployed, and these activities have served NATO's broader political objectives in post-conflict 
situations. 
 
NATO must work effectively with other organizations to establish the trust and confidence necessary for successful 
future operations. What some have called "ad-hoc-ery" in the coordination of efforts by international organizations 
since the early 1990s has worked, although at sub-optimal effectiveness. Some observers have accordingly referred 
to "an awkward teenage phase" in the Alliance's relations with other international organizations. 
How can cooperation be improved? 
Experts have advanced many suggestions for greater effectiveness in the conduct of operations. These include pre-
operational planning conferences, discussions of lessons learned and enhanced public information policies. 
 
Convening workshops might, for example, be a practical step, so representatives of the main international security 
organizations could discuss in an off-the-record fashion the principal obstacles to more effective cooperation and 
possible solutions. 
 
Facilities such as the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO School in Oberammergau could also provide 
more extensive education and training opportunities for members of other international organizations and leading 
NGOs. Staff officer exchanges could promote networking and mutual understanding, and could build a stronger 
sense of pursuing shared objectives. The Alliance could also expand its exercise activities involving representatives 
of other international organizations as observers and participants. 
 
Some observers have proposed creating an unclassified password-protected online central data base to avoid 
duplication in security and disposal activities for small arms, light weapons, ammunition and rocket fuel. Such a 
programme could also include border management, planning, exercises, and other activities. These arrangements 
could complement public diplomacy efforts and enable representatives of other international security organizations to 
gain a better understanding of NATO's capabilities and decision-making processes. 
 
The more ambitious concepts include: 
• convening NATO-EU-UN or NATO-EU-UN-OSCE meetings to discuss current operations; 
• a multilateral standing staff of all major international security organizations; 
• establishing a "contact group" of international organizations for each specific operation on the model of the 
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) established for the implementation of the Afghanistan 
Compact; and 
• a permanent assembly of international organizations and NGOs on the model of the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC), which brings together the key UN and non-UN organizations involved in humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
Some Allies have reservations about the Alliance 
assuming new political roles. They see formalizing 
and deepening the Alliance's relations with the 
UN, the OSCE, and other organizations as 
inconsistent with its traditional focus on collective 
defence and military operations. 
 
Yet another obstacle is that international security 
organizations, despite their differing strengths and 
mandates, are to some extent in competition for resources and missions. Some are wary of arrangements that might 
somehow diminish their autonomy, authority, and status. The continuing competition also derives in part from the 
ambitions of some states for certain organizations. 
 
Governments and international organizations have interests other than maximizing the effective use of resources and 
achieving optimal effects through cooperation. Practical "bottom-up" mission-driven cooperation between 
representatives of international organizations in the field has often proven more productive than "high politics" 
interactions among governments. 
 
While a continued pattern of improvisation - ad hoc accommodations and compromises - appears likely, the 
construction of a more coherent architecture of international security organizations and NGOs is still a goal well worth 
pursuing. 
 
David S. Yost, a professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He served as a senior 
research fellow at the NATO Defense College in Rome from 2004-2007. The views expressed are his alone and do 
not represent those of the Department of the Navy or any US government agency. This article is based on his study, 
NATO and International Organizations, Forum Paper no. 3 (Rome: NATO Defense College, September 2007), 
available at http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/fp_03.pdf. 
 
 
*Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. 
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